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Abstract—Selecting high performance routes in wireless
networks requires the exchange of link quality information
among nodes. Adversaries can manipulate this functionality
by advertising fake qualities for links; by doing so, they can
attract routes and subsequently launch pernicious attacks.
Our measurements suggest that malicious route attraction can
fatally impact throughput. We design a framework that is
effective against both independent and colluding attackers. In
the latter case, we consider both local and remote colluders.
With local collusion, malicious nodes exchange and advertise
fake routing information to increase the probability of being
selected as relays. Remote collusion refers to nodes residing
in distant parts of the network that (i) create sybil identities
in a local neighborhood and / or (ii) utilize link quality
reports to advertise fake links. Our framework combines
packet signing and frequency hopping to accurately detect
the adversaries. We implement the framework on our testbed
and conduct experiments to assess its efficacy. We observe
that our framework provides significant throughput benefits
by detecting attackers with 90% accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Selecting high performance routes requires nodes to assess
the quality of the individual links, typically in terms of
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) [1], [2]. To calculate the PDR,
routing protocols rely on the periodic transmission of probe
packets. Based on the number of received probes, a node
reports the PDR on its incident links to its neighbors.
One vulnerability of PDR reports is that an attacker can
report fake PDR values for the links to its neighbors. As
an example, it can advertise low (lower than the actual)
PDR values, thereby evading relay operations and causing
packets to follow lower-quality paths [3]. Such an attack
however, may not be as threatening since sources may still
find alternative paths of good quality. In our work, we focus
on the opposite, more challenging malicious strategy: an
attacker can advertise high (higher than the actual) PDR
values for its links, thereby increasing the probability of
becoming a relay. We call these nodes (that manipulate the
PDR to “attract” the routes) magnets and the specific attack,
a route magnet attack 1. As long as a magnet can attract a
route, it can easily launch any attack on packets (e.g., the
blackhole attack [4]).
1The attack resembles sinkhole attacks and we are not the first to identify
this general class of attacks. We use the term route magnet as a naming
convention.
In this paper we design and implement RoMaD, a Route
Magnet Detection framework that identifies such malicious
PDR manipulation and thus, can help avert paths from
magnets. We study the topological characteristics that (a)
render the network vulnerable to the attack, and (b) trigger
the online detection and mitigation of the magnets. We
highlight our main contributions in what follows:
1. Experimental study of strategies for attracting
paths based on PDR broadcasts: We perform an in-depth
study of both independent and colluding route magnets
via measurements on an indoor / outdoor wireless testbed.
We identify three collusion methods. First, two or more
magnets can locally collude against legitimate nodes; they
can exchange topological information and report fake link
qualities. Second, colluding magnets that are in distant parts
of the network can exchange credentials (i.e. authentication
keys), and launch sybil attacks in local neighborhoods.
Third, distant magnets with no common neighbors can use
the probing functionality to create the illusion of fake
“shortcut” links between a source and its destination 2.
2. Designing a framework for the detection of the
attack: We design and implement RoMaD, a unified route
magnet detector, which accurately detects all of the afore-
mentioned attacks, based on online observations. Our so-
lution consists of two components: NRC (Nonce Report
Component) and MCC (Multiband Challenge Component).
NRC ensures the truthfulness of probe reports through
nonces and constructs a list of potential magnets; MCC
detects attackers by challenging suspect nodes on different
channels and with variable power levels.
3. Evaluating the efficacy of RoMaD: We implement
RoMaD and evaluate it on a large-scale testbed at UC
Riverside [5]. We observe that RoMaD accurately detects
the magnets in all the considered cases; we also discuss the
false positive and false negative scenarios that can arise.
While previous work (e.g., [6], [7]) allude to using nonces
and frequency challenges, they lack an implementation on
an actual testbed. We are the first to integrate, implement
and evaluate the efficacy of these approaches on a real
experimental platform. The distinguishing aspects of our
study are:
• First, existing solutions on routing metric manipulation
are reactive: they assume that the metric is correctly calcu-
2These attacks differ from traditional wormhole attacks (see Section III).
lated before secure countermeasures are applied. In contrast,
our scheme is proactive: it a priori secures the metric
calculation, i.e., before route discovery and maintenance.
We believe that a proactive approach is essential to
effectively tackle attackers that manipulate link quality re-
ports. To illustrate this with an example, let us assume a
network that employs the DSDV routing protocol [8]. DSDV
proactively discovers new routes based on periodic routing
advertisements from nodes. The probes used to compute
the PDR are also sent periodically even if there is no
active data transmission in the network. Coupled with the
probes, DSDV discovers new routes (based on PDR) and
advertises this information to other nodes. If countermea-
sures are not applied at the probing stage, the PDR (as
manipulated by the attackers) would result in manipulated
route dissemination in the network. For this reason, the
reactive nature of the previous approaches (e.g., [9], [10],
[11]) renders them ineffective in addressing malicious PDR
manipulation. RoMaD, instead, takes a proactive approach
to detect the manipulation at its early stages (while incurring
some overhead in detecting the attackers).
• Second, we are the first to consider colluding magnets
that use diverse attack strategies. Previous work on magnets
assume only individual attackers [6], [15].
• Third, unlike most prior work we tackle route magnets
that are insiders (i.e., compromised nodes).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we provide brief background on link quality based routing
and discuss relevant previous work. In Section III, we profile
the attack strategies that magnets can use. We present the
design of RoMaD in Section IV. In Section V, we evaluate
RoMaD. We discuss future work in Section VI and our
conclusions form Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
PDR-based routing metrics: Modern routing metrics
account for the quality of individual links. The Expected
Transmission Count, ETX [1], of a link corresponds to
the expected number of transmissions (including retrans-
missions) needed for the successful reception of a packet
on the link. In particular, ETX = 1/(pf · pr) , where pf
and pr are the PDR values on the forward and the reverse
directions of the link, respectively. The ETX cost of a route
is the sum of the ETX values of the links on the route. The
source node selects the route with the minimum ETX cost.
Similarly, other metrics such as ETT and WCETT [2] use
PDR information to compute the metric.
All of the above metrics rely on a real-time probing
functionality in order to measure the PDR. To achieve
this, each node periodically broadcasts probe packets every
τ seconds. Nodes report the number of probes received
from each neighbor during a window of ω seconds. This
information is piggybacked in future probes; it is used to
compute the PDR for both directions of a link and thereby,
its corresponding metric. While a node can directly measure
the reverse PDR, pr , for neighbor links (i.e., the PDR of
the link from a neighbor), it relies on the reports from its
neighbors to learn about the forward PDR, pf (i.e., the PDR
of the link to a neighbor). If malicious nodes report very
high PDR values for their links (affecting the pf for their
neighbors and resulting in a lower ETX), they can coerce
source nodes into selecting them as relays. Hence, the goal
of a route magnet is to assume the role of a relay on routes
that are selected based on any of the above metrics, by
reporting fake, high PDR values. Note that this vulnerability
is also inherited by any other metric that leverages a similar
probing mechanism to measure the PDR.
Secure routing: There have been studies on specific
versions of route attraction attacks. In [9], SAODV, a secure
version of AODV [12] is proposed to prevent the modifica-
tion of the hop count metric by adversaries. ARIADNE [10]
is a secure version of DSR [13]; it also protects routing
messages from being altered by adversaries. SEAD [11]
protects the metric and sequence number fields in DSDV [8].
All of these studies inherently assume that the routing metric
is truthfully calculated and secure measures are used only
to subsequently protect the metric. In our work however,
the PDR-based metric can be manipulated even before the
route discovery process. In such cases, the methods in above
studies would try to protect a metric information that is not
truthfully calculated in the first place! Hence, it is essential
to secure the route setup operations proactively (as we do in
this work), rather than trying to avert adversaries after route
establishment.
Studies on route magnets: In [3], a solution is proposed
to tackle the problem of selfish nodes reporting a lower PDR;
the goal of this attack is to discourage routes from passing
through these selfish participants. However, a source may
find alternative paths that may still provide good perfor-
mance. Zeng et al. [6] propose SLQM to prevent adversaries
from reporting inflated PDR values, through the use of
nonces. However, the solution does not consider colluding
attackers and as we will show later, it can easily be bypassed
by colluders. Moreover, the authors do not implement their
scheme to sufficiently quantify the impact of the attack in
a real setting. [14] studies PDR manipulation in multicast
protocols. The proposed method does not handle sybil
attackers and is subject to framing attacks where attackers
can falsely claim that a benign node is malicious. In [15],
the authors propose a method to detect the sinkhole attack
in sensor networks, by comparing reported link qualities
between nodes. The sinkhole attack is similar to the attack
launched by route magnets, where malicious nodes try to
attract routes by faking link qualities. However, specific
solutions proposed in [15] do not apply to our setting and
have the following limitations:
• [15] assumes that the link qualities are symmetric
between two nodes; however as is well known, this is
not always the case in wireless networks. We show via
real experiments that asymmetric links result in certain
issues that render [15] ineffective. In contrast, RoMaD
can effectively operate in scenarios with diverse set of
link qualities.
• [15] assumes that attackers do not collude i.e., there is
a single independent attacker that launches the attack.
In contrast, RoMaD can effectively cope with various
forms of collusion.
• Unlike [15], we demonstrate the impact of the attack
and the viability of our solution on a real wireless
testbed.
Other relevant studies: Newsome et al. [7] propose the
use of radio resource testing to challenge sybil suspects by
listening on the assigned channels. However, this challenge
procedure is limited only to detecting the presence of sybil
devices. In contrast, our work has a broader scope since we
also ensure trustworthy PDR reporting.
There are efforts on detecting wormhole [16], blackhole,
grayhole [4] and jellyfish attacks [17]. Hu et al. [18] propose
the use of temporal and geographical leashes to detect the
wormhole links. Using temporal leashes requires precise
clock synchronization among the nodes. Geographic leashes
rely on the physical location of a node, which might not be
trivial to compute in adversarial settings. Hu and Evans [19]
use directional antennas to detect wormholes; however, the
study relies on such specialized hardware, which may not be
available in practice. In [20], the authors use graph theory
to detect the wormholes. Eriksson et al. [21] investigate the
use of link layer timing to prevent wormhole connections
between two nodes. Note that unlike in our work, in all of
the above studies, malicious devices are considered to be
“outsiders”, rather than compromised nodes that participate
in network operations.
III. PROFILING ROUTE MAGNETS
Route magnets can attract routes using various methods.
We profile each method to assess its effectiveness. We do
not present detailed experimental results here due to space
constraints and simply summarize our main observations. A
more extensive set of results can be found in [22].
Threat model: We consider as malicious, the nodes that
try to manipulate the route discovery process through either
fake PDR reports, remote collusion, or combinations thereof.
The name “magnet” is chosen to represent the specific ma-
licious action of “attracting” routes and not to represent the
particular attack on the packets themselves (e.g., blackhole,
jellyfish). These other attacks that target flows are only
possible if the attacker is present on the specific route; we
address the specific case where the attackers try to cause
routes to go through them with the intention of launching
additional attacks on information flows. In other words,
RoMAD focuses on detecting the magnets rather than the
particular attacks on packets.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we assume that magnets
are compromised regular nodes (i.e., insiders) in the net-
work. Therefore, in terms of most hardware capabilities, they
are no different than any other node. The only difference we
envision is the Ethernet (or some other out of band) link used
for collusion (explained in detail later).
The attack strategies that we consider adopt the common
tactic of advertising fake, high PDR values. However, they
differ in terms of the specifics of the attack strategy. In
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Figure 1. The independent magnet X advertises fake PDR values (benign
values are crossed out) in order to attract the route from S to C.
most cases, we consider two colluders. Our solution is
applicable to cases with more than two colluders; however,
we recognize that a more in-depth investigation is required
and will consider this in future work.
Network assumptions: We consider a network that em-
ploys public key infrastructure (PKI). Specifically, each
node is assumed to have a public-private key pair used for
encryption and authentication. The certificates are verified
and managed by a certification authority (CA). The message
contents encrypted with the public key of a node can only
be decrypted using the private key of the particular node.
We did not observe significant throughput overhead due
to encrypting the probes since these are typically small
packets (100 - 200 bytes). Our testbed consists of Soekris
nodes having 266 MHz processors and 256 MB RAM
on board. We believe that probe encryption can easily be
deployed in today’s wireless networks, which have nodes
with much faster processors and increasing amounts of
available memory.
As mentioned before, RoMaD addresses attackers that
manipulate PDR-based routing metrics. Since these metrics
utilize periodic probe broadcasts, they are not suitable for
networks with energy constraints (e.g., sensor networks). We
believe that RoMaD is most applicable to 802.11 networks
where PDR-based routing metrics have already been imple-
mented and demonstrated to offer throughput benefits [1],
[2]. However, as we show in this paper, these metrics offer
a new ground for the attackers to impede the benefits and
should be complemented with a detection framework such
as RoMaD. We now proceed to describe different types of
route magnets and the attack strategies that they use.
A. Independent Route Magnets
Malicious devices in this category advertise high PDR
values for the links from their neighbors. For example,
consider the topology in Fig. 1, where node X is the only
magnet. The source node S wishes to setup a route to
destination C. In benign conditions, S chooses the path
S − A − B − C. However, if X reports a very high PDR
value (e.g., PDR = 1) for the links S − X and B − X
(both links have a PDR = 0.5 in reality), it is easy to verify
that S will choose the route S − X − B − C (since
it is the route with the lowest aggregate ETX value). With
this, X successfully attracts the route from S to C. We
call this attack IRM, for Independent Route Magnets. Note
that although X tries to manipulate S by advertising fake
qualities for its attached links, S may still select a route that
does not include X . This is because X cannot advertise fake
PDR values for links other than its own. Hence it may be
possible that the aggregate ETX value for other routes is
still lower.
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Figure 2. Local colluders can exchange information via Ethernet. Sybil magnets can attract routes without manipulating the PDR.
When is IRM effective? We conduct experiments to
assess the ability of independent magnets to attract routes in
different topological scenarios. We observe that by attracting
routes, even if no other attack is launched in conjunction
(like a blackhole attack), there can be up to a 90% through-
put reduction compared to benign cases (the experiment
is described in [22]). The main reason for this throughput
reduction is that the quality of the links comprising the route
degrades (as in Fig. 1). In addition, we observe that:
a. IRM is most effective on asymmetric links: Our
measurements suggest that IRM is especially effective when
applied on links where the PDR on the link <magnet -
neighbor> is significantly higher than that in the reverse
direction. This is because on such links: (a) the magnet can
easily lie about the PDR from neighbors by reporting high
values, and (b) most of the magnet’s reports are actually
received by neighbors, due to their good incident links. Note
here that this property of magnets renders the solution in [15]
ineffective. Since the magnets make the link “look like”
symmetric via PDR manipulation, [15] perceives this as a
benign operation.
b. The hop distance between a source and its destination
affects the potency of IRM: Independent magnets can only
manipulate the PDR on their neighbor links and thus their
effect is localized. To illustrate, node X is trying to attract
the route from S to D and become the relay instead of node
R (see Fig. 2(a)). The magnet cannot fake the PDR for the
nodes on the path from R to D and similarly from X to D.
As one might expect, with shorter paths the probability of
attracting the route is higher. In our experiments, we observe
that when the source and the destination are separated by
many hops, it is harder for the magnet to attract the route.
This is because with longer routes, the path cost is the sum
of the ETX values of a higher number of links (not under
control of the magnet). Since one independent magnet can
manipulate at most two links on a path, it typically does
not cause node S to pick the path with X . With few hops,
however, magnet’s ETX manipulation significantly affects
the best path decision.
B. Colluding Route Magnets
Simple solutions can prevent IRMs from being effective.
As an example, benign nodes could mark the probes with
random nonces and require their neighbors to report the
actual nonces (or a linear function of such nonces) from the
probes that they receive. This makes it difficult for IRMs
to lie about the received probes from neighbors. However,
colluding magnets can easily bypass this strategy as we
explain in the following.
Local Colluders: If two or more magnets (having a com-
mon neighbor) cooperate, they can exchange information
about the nonces that they have each deciphered from the
common neighbor(s). In other words, if magnets were to
collude, they could cooperatively report high PDR values.
We call these devices “local colluders”, and the attack CRM
(for Colluding Route Magnets).
As an example, consider the topology in Fig. 2(b). Nodes
X and Y are two local colluders; S requires neighbors to
report the sum of all the nonces that they receive. The link
S − X has PDR = 0.2, while the link S − Y has a
PDR = 1. For X to join the route from S to C, it has to
report PDR = 1 for the link S − X . For this, X has to
provide the sum of all the nonces included in the probes that
have been transmitted by S during the last probing interval.
Since the colluder Y has received all the probes (PDR =
1), it can send all the nonces to X ; X can then embed this
information in probes, thereby fooling S about the quality
of the link S − X . Recall that colluding magnets utilize a
private Ethernet link to exchange information.
Sybil Magnets: Colluding magnets, being insider ad-
versaries, can share their cryptographic keys. With this,
magnets can create a large number of identities in a local
neighborhood and use them to increase the probability
of being selected as relays. Such a magnet can be one
physical device with many virtual wireless interfaces, and
each interface could be used to transmit probes with different
MAC addresses. Upon receiving the probes, legitimate nodes
will falsely believe that the fake identities correspond to real
neighbors. We call these magnets “sybil magnets” and the
attack SRM, for Sybil Route Magnets. The number of fake
sybil identities that a magnet can create is at most equal to
the number of compromised nodes in the network. This is
because, in order to create a sybil identity, the magnet needs
to have an additional set of predicates (i.e., keys) that are
only obtainable by compromising an additional node.
Fig. 2(c) depicts a representative example of SRM. Here,
S seeks to find the route to C. A and X both have high
quality links to S (ETX = 1). In the benign case, it is equally
likely that S selects A or X as the next hop. However, if
X creates four identities, S observes that it has 5 neighbors
all of which have links with ETX = 1. With this, X has
now increased the probability of being selected on a path
to 0.8 (instead of 0.5 in benign settings). Note that, IRM
and CRM are not effective in cases where the magnets have
high quality links with their neighbors. In such scenarios,
the PDR manipulation does not give any advantage to the
magnets since the benign PDR for the links are already quite
high. However, in such cases, the magnets can employ SRM
to attract paths.
Distant Magnets: Colluding magnets can also mount
wormhole-like attacks on link quality aware routing pro-
tocols. In traditional wormhole attacks, outside attackers
create fake links between two legitimate nodes by replaying
the transmissions of one node in the neighborhood of the
other. In our threat model, the attackers are insiders; they
announce the fake link between themselves and the routes
are computed based on the qualities of the links rather than
simply the hop counts. Thus with collusion, an effect similar
to the wormhole is created albeit in a different way.
There are two strategies that distant colluders can use.
First, colluding insider magnets can exchange their keys
and use these when sending probes to their neighbors. As
an example, let us assume nodes A and B are located in
two “distant” parts of the network. If A uses B’s credentials
while sending probes, A’s neighbors will falsely conclude
that they are neighbors with B. With this, such victim nodes
will be deluded into believing that there exist shortcuts to
other valid nodes via the magnet (since it advertises the
neighbor list of B). This is likely to increase the chances of
magnets attracting a path. Second, two magnets can advertise
a fake link between themselves even without exchanging
credentials. This can still result in fake shortcuts between
legitimate nodes. We call these types of magnets together
“distant magnets” and the strategy DRM for Distant Route
Magnets. As we show later, these attacks are extremely
harmful; once the magnets create the fake link, they can
attract many routes and can easily hurt performance by
dropping packets.
Impact of Colluding Magnets on Performance: Thus
far, we have not shown the impact of magnets on perfor-
mance (e.g., throughput). For the throughput to be affected,
the quality of the path should change from that in benign
settings (e.g. poorer quality links or longer paths) as in
Fig. 1. With colluding magnets, the quality may be similar
to that of in benign settings (as in Fig. 2(c)). However,
once they attract a path, the magnets can launch other
attacks to significantly impact the performance. We conduct
comprehensive experiments with magnets in Section V.
IV. DETECTION FRAMEWORK
RoMaD consists of two components: namely NRC and
MCC. NRC includes nonces in probe packets; it can be used
to (a) detect IRMs and (b) compile a list of suspect colluding
magnets via simple hypothesis tests. MCC uses multiple
channels and transmission power levels to challenge the
suspect nodes determined by NRC. Since a single wireless
interface can be tuned to one frequency at a time, it is
expected that SRMs will not be able to simultaneously
respond to challenges on more than one channel. Similarly,
as discussed later, CRMs will be greatly limited in their
Algorithm 1 NRC operation at B
P is the list of probes received from A
sum← 0
vector ← 0 {initialize a vector of 0s}
seq ← last sequence number used
for p ∈ P do
sum← sum+ p.nonce
i← p.seq no mod (w/τ )
vector.i+ 1th bit← 1 {set i+ 1th bit to 1}
end for
seq ++
nonce← random int
{store [seq, nonce] and send report}
abilities to exchange nonce information. In addition, the use
of different power levels help detect DRMs.
A. NRC: Nonce Report Component
With NRC, each node includes a pre-specified linear
function (the sum in our implementation) of the nonces that
it receives from its neighbors, when it reports the PDR. The
recipient verifies the included sum; should the verification
fail, the transmitter is flagged as an IRM. To illustrate the
semantics of NRC, consider two neighbors A and B. A
broadcasts probes once every τ seconds, while B reports the
corresponding PDR for the last ω seconds. In every probe,
A embeds the following: (i) a nonce value that is randomly
picked and (ii) a sequence number that is incremented by
one. A also maintains a local copy of the tuple of the
sequence number and the nonce associated with each probe.
The recipient, B, maintains the following: (a) a moving
sum of the nonces that it receives from A during the last
probing window and (b) the tuple of the sequence number
and the nonce included in each received probe. Whenever
B reports the PDR for the link A − B, it includes the
sum of the nonces (from the probes sent by A), along with
a bit vector indicating the sequence numbers of the received
probes. B sets the ith significant bit to 1, if a probe with
sequence number seq ≡ i − 1 (mod ω/τ) is received; if
not, the particular bit is set to 0.
A verifies the sum of nonces reported by B in conjunction
with B’s bit vector. For example, if B reports a vector
wherein all the bits are set to 1, then B must have received
all the probes sent by A. Node A, in this case, computes an
expected sum by adding the nonces in all the locally stored
tuples. A then verifies this expected sum against the sum of
nonces reported by B. Note that A can learn about the PDR
of the link A − B by accounting for the bits set to ‘1’ in
the reported bit vector. We present the pseudocode for nodes
B and A in Algorithm 1 and 2, respectively.
Despite the use of nonces, IRMs can still evade detection
by NRC. One strategy is to overhear the probe reports sent
by legitimate neighbors to infer the missing nonces. In order
to address this, we leverage PKI. Specifically, each node is
required to sign the reports with its private key and encrypt
the signed report using the destination node’s public key.
With this, magnets will not be able to decode the sum of
nonces contained in overheard probes, since they do not have
Algorithm 2 NRC operation at A
p is the probe (report) received from B
num rx← 0, expectedSum← 0
i← 1
for i ≤ p.vector.length; incr i do
if vector.ith bit = 1 then
nnc← assoc.nonce
{assoc has seq no ≡ i− 1 (mod w/τ )}
expectedSum← expectedSum+ nnc
num rx++
end if
end for
if expectedSum &= claimedSum then
B is misbehaving
else
pdr to B ← num rx ∗ τ/w
end if
L List of potential magnets
pf and pr Forward PDR and reverse PDR of a link
padf Forward PDR advertised by a node
pactf Actual forward PDR for a link found using MCC
α MCC tolerance parameter
challenger The node initiating MCC challenge
responder The node being challenged by MCC
Table I
TERMS AND NOTATIONS
the private key of the destination. In addition to detecting
IRMs, NRC is also leveraged for hypothesis tests with MCC
to detect colluding magnets. We discuss this next.
B. MCC: Multiband Challenge Component
The primary goal of MCC is the detection of colluding
magnets. MCC leverages multiple channels and transmission
power levels to challenge suspect nodes. The key insight be-
hind MCC is that a wireless interface cannot simultaneously
operate on two different channels. We enlist the definitions
that we use in Table I. In what follows, we present the
operations of MCC.
The ‘high forward PDR’ hypothesis test: The chal-
lenger identifies the nodes that it wishes to challenge using
a hypothesis test. If a node were to challenge all of its
neighbors, the overhead due to MCC would be excessive.
Thus, it is important to first identify a subset of the neighbors
L who could be potential magnets. To construct this subset,
NRC computes the average forward PDR, pavgf , over all links
of a node (after IRMs are filtered out). If a neighbor reports
a forward PDR much higher than that of the other nodes,
then NRC includes it in L. Specifically, these are neighbors
that report a forward PDR padf ≥ pavgf + ϑ ∗ var, where
ϑ is a threshold parameter and var is the variance of pf
values. The hypothesis test is based on the fact that magnets
typically advertise high PDR to increase the probability of
being selected as relays.
The above hypothesis alone cannot identify potential
SRMs since they can operate without inflating the PDR (see
Section III). However, since sybil identities belong to the
same physical node, these identities will report the same
Algorithm 3 MCC operation
while all channels are challenged with less than m packets do
channel← randomchannel
node← channel.assigned node
reply ← challenge(node, channel)
if reply then
node.success count ++
end if
end while
for node ∈ L do
compute pactf for node as pactf = k/(m · pr)
if padf − pactf ≥ α then
node is misbehaving
end if
end for
PDR statistics. Therefore, coupled with the forward PDR
hypothesis, NRC also monitors if there is more than one
node reporting the same set of nonces. If there are such
nodes, NRC includes them in L as well.
The challenge procedure: The challenger assigns a
different channel to each node in L and broadcasts this
information on the default channel. The nodes that receive
this announcement configure their radios to their assigned
channels and wait for challenge packets. The challenger
then randomly selects a channel and transmits one or more
challenge packets. Each such packet has an associated ran-
dom nonce (we leverage NRC). If the responder receives the
packet successfully, it is expected to report the nonce back
to the challenger. Using this procedure, at random instants,
the challenger sends m packets to each node in L and, keeps
track of the number of successful replies. It then calculates
the difference between padf and pactf (see Table I) for each
responder. If padf − pactf < α, the particular responder is
considered to be legitimate; otherwise it is flagged as a
magnet. The challenger computes pactf for each responder
as pactf = k/(m · pr) where k is the number of successfully
received responses (out of m). We present the operation of
MCC in Algorithm 3.
Discarding sybil identities: As discussed in Section III,
SRMs report a high padf value by using multiple virtual
identities. Hence, NRC includes all the identities of a sybil
node in list L. MCC then assigns a different channel to
each of these identities. The fact that nodes are equipped
with a single radio interface prevents SRMs from listening
on more than one channel at a time 3. Hence, if a sybil
magnet stays on one of its assigned channels, the challenger
will detect and discard the other fake identities since these
will not be able to reply to the challenge packets. Note that
with MCC, the challenger cannot actually detect the physical
sybil magnet; however, it can discard the fake identities,
thereby decreasing the success of SRM to a great extent. An
alternate strategy for the magnet could be to “hop” between
the assigned channels and try to be on the same channel
as the challenger. However, due to the random channel
3The approach can easily be extended to cases where nodes have multiple
wireless interfaces. A node will be required to simultaneously respond on
more than one channel.
selection, the probability of tuning to the same channel as the
challenger is 1/c, where c is the number of virtual identities
used by the magnet. Clearly, the probability decreases with
larger number of sybil identities.
Detecting local colluders: CRMs exchange nonce infor-
mation using their Ethernet link. If the colluders report a
padf greater than the threshold in the hypothesis test, they
are included in list L. During the MCC challenge, one
strategy for the colluders could be to reply to challenges
addressed to their colluding partner. This can especially be a
feasible strategy when one of the colluders maintain a high-
PDR link to the challenger node (e.g., Fig. 2(b)). However,
the challenge on different channels makes it difficult for a
suspect to respond on behalf of its colluder. Since a node
can only be on one channel at a time, it cannot respond to
the challenges issued to its colluding partner if it stays on its
own channel. Conversely, if it chooses to be on the channel
assigned to the colluding partner, it misses the challenges on
its own channel. Thus, the assignment of different channels
discourages colluders from hopping between channels.
Detecting distant magnets: The challenge phase for
detecting DRMs is slightly different. It uses a different
hypothesis test and employs multiple transmission powers.
The ‘topological inconsistency’ hypothesis test: Main-
taining the average forward PDR of the links is not sufficient
to hypothesize about attacks launched by DRMs. These
magnets can easily inject “shortcut” links without being
classified as suspects. To cope with these magnets, we re-
quire each node to encrypt the nonce information (described
earlier), but send out the node IDs of its neighbors without
encryption. This connectivity information is also essential
for the routing functionality with ETX [1].
Each node monitors the reports from its neighbors to
determine its two-hop neighborhood. If a subset of nodes
in the two-hop neighborhood are reachable through only
one neighbor, that immediate neighbor is suspected to be
a distant magnet and included in L. We point out that
even with this simple test, RoMaD captures the topological
anomalies imposed by distant magnets and successfully
detects the adversaries, as shown in Section V.
The power challenge procedure: To detect DRMs, MCC
assigns channels in the following manner. A channel is
assigned to one of the suspects in L and the remaining
channels are assigned to the two-hop neighbors that are
only reachable through that suspect node. MCC then uses an
appropriately chosen higher transmission power (assuming
that the default power is less than the maximum) in an
attempt to reach the two-hop neighbors and verify their
existence via challenge packets. We explain this with an
example in Fig. 3. Assume that nodes X and Y advertise
a fake link between themselves. Let us also assume that
Y obtains X’s PDR statistics and advertises them. When
A receives probes from Y , it observes that X is a two-
hop neighbor that is reachable only through Y . Thus, the
topology inconsistency test tags Y as a suspect and MCC
assigns channels to X and Y . The challenges are now issued
with a higher power to see if X is indeed a legitimate two-
D
A
B
C
XY
fake link
Figure 3. Example topology for power challenge.
hop neighbor. If A does not receive enough replies from X ,
it considers Y to be malicious.
The power challenge does not target the two-hop neighbor
that is reachable through the suspect node. Instead, it deter-
mines whether the one-hop suspect is a magnet. If the higher
power transmissions do not reach the two-hop distance and
the challenge packets fail for the two-hop neighbor, the one-
hop suspect is categorized as a distant magnet. This property
discourages DRMs; it forces them to advertise fake links
between relatively nearby regions of the network. This limits
the reach of the fake link and thus, reduces the chances that
a magnet is chosen as a relay.
One could argue that since nodes are flagged as malicious
by other peers (challengers), framing attacks are possible,
wherein malicious nodes could flag honest nodes as magnets.
However, note that RoMaD is not affected by such attacks.
In particular, each node performs its own challenge of a
suspect and decides whether the latter is a magnet or not.
In other words, only the specific challenger avoids paths
through a node considered as a magnet. Thus, there is no
opportunity for the attackers to blame legitimate nodes.
V. EVALUATING OUR FRAMEWORK
Our testbed (see [5] for details) consists of 42 Soekris
net5501 nodes. For each experiment on the testbed, we initi-
ate a series of benign flows and deploy the malicious devices.
We simultaneously activate 5 different source-destination
pairs. We measure the aggregate end-to-end throughput
under the following settings: (a) when every node is benign,
with and without RoMaD, (b) when the magnets are active
without RoMaD, and (c) RoMaD is performing against the
magnets. We repeat experiments with each of these three
settings 20 times with randomly picked flows and magnets.
We collect measurements from the 5 flows and calculate the
total throughput (averaged over 20 runs). All nodes set their
transmission powers to the default value of 15 dBm. We
mainly use saturated UDP traffic with 1500 byte packets. We
use DSDV (with ETX) as the routing protocol and set τ = 1
sec and ω = 10 sec. We use the iperf tool for generating
traffic. Since we observe that the results with and without
RoMaD in benign settings are almost identical (given the
low overhead as discussed later), for clarity we only show
the results for the benign case without RoMaD. Next, we
evaluate RoMaD against each attack.
1. Performance with independent magnets: We activate
5 flows and one independent magnet simultaneously in
each experiment and initiate 300 sec. of saturated UDP
traffic. The magnet drops all packets after attracting the
routes (i.e., blackhole attack). The cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the throughput samples is presented
in Fig. 4. Without RoMaD, nearly 10% of the samples
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Figure 4. RoMaD increases the
median throughput by 40% under
IRM.
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Figure 5. RoMaD can effec-
tively combat increasing number
of magnets.
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Figure 6. RoMaD increases the
median throughput by 76% under
CRM.
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Figure 7. RoMaD increases the
median throughput by 92% under
SRM.
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Figure 8. RoMaD increases the
maximum achievable throughput
by 380% for 90% of the samples,
under DRM.
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Figure 9. In a bottleneck set-
ting, RoMaD increases the me-
dian throughput by ≈ 680%
when under attack.
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switch, TCP enters the slow start
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correspond to a zero throughput (with a median throughput
of 390 Kbits/sec). RoMaD successfully detects the magnet
and restores the throughput to a large extent. The median
throughput achieved in benign settings is 672 Kbits/sec;
RoMaD achieves a median throughput of 547 Kbits/sec.
RoMaD increases the overhead in terms of increased probe
packet size and the MCC challenge. However, the throughput
improvements outweigh this overhead.
Next, we perform a similar set of experiments with differ-
ent numbers of IRMs. We present the CDF of the throughput
in Fig. 5. We observe that without RoMaD, increasing the
number of magnets results in a higher percentage of dropped
packets due to the increased chance of attracting the routes.
RoMaD can effectively combat increased numbers of IRMs.
In benign settings, the median aggregate throughput is 770
Kbits/sec; RoMaD restores the median throughput to 600
Kbits/sec when under attack.
2. Performance with colluding magnets: We activate 5
flows and a pair of local colluding magnets. The colluders
exchange the nonces that they receive and report a joint
fake PDR value for common neighbors. The magnets drop
all packets after attracting the routes. The flows initiate 300
sec. of saturated UDP traffic. We observe from Fig. 6 that
RoMaD is effective against local colluders and improves
throughput by avoiding the routes via the magnets. However,
the throughput cannot be completely restored due to the
overhead with MCC.
We perform another set of experiments with a sybil
magnet using two different virtual identities. Further, the
magnet launches a blackhole attack. To evade detection
during the challenge, the magnet switches between its
assigned channels at random times. Fig. 7 shows that
without RoMaD, a sybil magnet drops nearly 20% of the
packets. However, the MCC challenge effectively detects
the fake identities, eliminates them from the paths and
thereby restores the throughput to a large extent. The median
throughput achieved in benign settings is 576 Kbits/sec.
RoMaD restores the median throughput from 235 to 456
Kbits/sec in adverse settings.
Next, we activate 5 flows and two pairs of DRMs. The
magnets advertise a fake link of ETX = 1 between each
other and implement the blackhole attack. For this set of
experiments, the nodes operate at 15 dBm and increase the
power to 19 dBm (max. supported by our cards) during the
MCC power challenge. Fig. 8 presents CDF of the through-
put. Without RoMaD, the magnets attract up to 84% of the
packets and cause zero throughput. RoMaD is effective and
the power challenge phase eliminates the shortcut links. In
benign settings, the median throughput is 1611 Kbits/sec
whereas RoMaD achieves a median throughput of 1300
Kbits/sec in attack scenarios.
3. Performance with a bottleneck scenario: When
the magnets attract routes, they become bottlenecks for
the flows. Thus, magnets hurt performance even by simply
attracting victim flows. To examine this more carefully, we
choose three source-destination pairs all active at the same
time; the flows use disjoint routes in benign settings and
can coexist without imposing much interference on each
other. We introduce an IRM, which attracts the three flows
and becomes a bottleneck. Note that the magnet does not
implement the blackhole attack. We present the throughput
for 300 sec. of TCP traffic in Fig. 9. Without RoMaD, the
congestion at the magnet reduces the TCP throughput by
88%. RoMaD successfully detects the magnet and restores
the throughputs.
In the experiments so far, we evaluate the performance
of RoMaD over long flow durations. The throughput with
RoMaD includes the macroscopic overhead of the MCC
challenge over a long duration. We observe that RoMaD’s
overhead is lower when it combats IRM (Fig. 4), than in
cases with colluding magnets. This is because IRMs are
immediately detected via the nonces in NRC and thus the
MCC challenge is not activated frequently. Next, we want
to evaluate the microscopic impact of the MCC challenge.
4. Evaluating MCC overhead: As discussed in Section
IV, the nodes switch channels to respond to challenges and
return to the default channel when the challenge is over. We
evaluate the temporary interruption of traffic at a relay node
due to channel switching. The relay node is configured to
switch to a different channel, stay there for 1 sec. and return
to the default channel. This cycle is repeated every 10 sec.
We deliberately choose these durations to better visualize
the impact of MCC (the reported penalties are significantly
lower in practice). Fig. 10 presents the time series of the
throughput both for a UDP and a TCP flow. We observe that
UDP can quickly regain the throughput that was achieved
before the switch. The recovery time is slightly longer with
TCP due to timeouts and congestion control. However, as
shown in Fig. 11, it can quickly ramp up the congestion
window to the value before the switch.
5. Impact of the overhead of RoMaD: RoMaD incurs
overhead when deployed in a network where every node
is benign. As explained in Section IV, NRC monitors the
PDR reports and builds a list of suspect nodes. During
the PDR report monitoring, each node has to periodically
sign and verify the reports which has an overhead on CPU
usage. We found that these operations however, only had an
insignificant impact on the throughput.
When the nodes are challenged, there is an overhead due
to temporal loss of connectivity at relay nodes (evaluated
above). To keep the frequency of challenges minimal, Ro-
MaD only challenges nodes that report much higher than
average PDR values (as discussed earlier). We observe in
our experiments with benign nodes, that RoMaD invokes
MCC challenge very rarely. This is because in such settings,
each node truthfully reports the actual PDR and these do not
exhibit a high deviation from the average. Therefore, the
performance with and without RoMaD in benign settings
is very similar. Thus, for purposes of clarity we do not
explicitly plot these results.
6. Evaluating false positives and negatives: We observe
rare cases where MCC wrongly tags a neighbor as malicious.
This is possible when the links to the neighbor are of
poor quality. If the quality of the link to the challenger
fluctuates, the benign node may fail the challenge. Fig. 12
depicts the false positive rate with RoMaD (i.e., the ratio of
suspects that were erroneously tagged as malicious out of
the total number of suspects) for a set of ϑ and α values.
We observe that: (a) For a given ϑ, the false positive rate
decreases with increasing α. This is due to the increase in
the allowed difference between the measured and reported
PDR values for the suspect nodes. (b) As ϑ increases, a
smaller set of nodes are included in the suspect list and
therefore, the challenge produces fewer false positives. For
appropriately picked α and ϑ, RoMaD can achieve false
positive probabilities as low as 3.7%.
False positives with the power challenge phase can occur
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if some nodes in the two-hop neighborhood are reachable
via only one benign neighbor. In Fig. 13, we show the false
positive rates for different default power levels (increased to
19 dBm during the power challenge). For 9 dBm, the nodes
are connected with very short range links; therefore most
of the suspected two-hop neighbors are validated with a 19
dBm power level during the challenge phase. As the default
power level increases and the topology gets more connected,
there is an increase in suspicious cases which in turn leads
to increased false positives. However, once the connectivity
increases beyond a certain degree, two-hop neighbors be-
come legitimate one-hop neighbors and the false positives
decrease. Note that the current implementation is based on
a rather “aggressive” approach towards identifying magnets.
Thus we observe very low false negatives at the expense
of moderate false positives (10% to 17%); fake links are
detected with > 95% accuracy throughout our experiments.
A false positive simply eliminates a benign node from
being chosen on a path; thus the overall impact on through-
put is typically not significant. We would like to point out
that we observe very few false negatives (only 2 among
all our experiments) in the MCC challenge phase. In these
cases, both colluding magnets maintain high quality links
with their neighbors and can therefore handle the challenge
packets. However, note that in such settings, IRM and CRM
strategies do not provide an advantage to the magnets since
the link quality cannot be manipulated to be better. We find
that the MCC challenge phase is extremely effective against
sybil magnets (recall Fig. 7); we do not observe a case where
they are able to evade detection.
Limitations of our work: With RoMaD, there is no
coordination between legitimate devices with regards to
which node will perform a challenge. For example, it is
possible that two or more nodes decide to perform MCC
on certain suspects at the same time. Since this requires the
assignment of channels to suspects, a distributed decision
should be made on who will perform the challenge and for
which set of nodes. We plan to design such a protocol in
our future work.
We recognize that MCC introduces a new vulnerability;
an attacker can initiate frequent challenges to its neighbors.
This causes a neighbor to consistently respond to these
challenges thereby suffering a disruption in throughput for
prolonged periods. This problem can be alleviated by im-
posing a maximum rate at which the MCC challenge can be
invoked. We will consider this possibility and examine the
trade-offs between fast detection and opening the door for
the new attack in future work.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
Combining different attacks: In our evaluations, we con-
sider each type of attack in isolation. We do so to capture the
specific impact of each type of attack. We recognize that an
attacker could launch these attacks in conjunction to be more
effective. Our approach will still hold in such cases and we
believe can detect attackers. This is because NRC identifies
potential attackers based on the deviation from the average
PDR in the neighborhood (no assumption is made on the
attack type). Thus, even if an adversary combines attacks
of different types, it is likely to be flagged by NRC and
subsequently challenged by MCC. We will experimentally
validate this in further experiments in future work.
Efficacy of the Power Challenge: We wish to point out
that the power challenge is only issued on nodes that are
flagged by NRC. Thus, even though the false positive rate
of the power challenge is about 10 - 17%, the overall
false positive rate (considering NRC) is much lower. We
do recognize that the efficacy of the power challenge is
topology dependent; while it effectively detects attackers in
the topologies of our testbed, the possibilities considered are
not clearly exhaustive. We will conduct a more extensive
study of the power challenge in future work. Note also
that false positives typically do not result in significant
throughput penalties. Even if a benign node is falsely flagged
as a magnet, there maybe other candidate relays with similar
link qualities. On the other hand, false negatives have a
higher impact on throughput since a magnet (not detected
via the challenge) can perform packet manipulation attacks.
RoMaD leverages this in its design; the “aggressive” power
challenge results in very few false negatives while allowing
a moderate degree of false positives. Thus, we expect that
RoMaD will not result in significant throughput loss when
it incurs false positives.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We profile and address an attack on link quality based
routing protocols: by advertising fake PDR values, adver-
saries (called magnets) can attract routes and affect end-to-
end throughput. We consider independent attacks and attacks
involving collusion. Magnets may collude locally, create
sybil identities or establish distant collusion. We design and
implement a framework, RoMaD, that can be used as a
unified solution against the various flavors of the attack. Ro-
MaD helps create adversary-free routes proactively through
(a) tagging PDR probes with nonces, and (b) challenging
suspect nodes on different channels and power levels. Our
extensive experiments on a 42 node testbed demonstrate
that RoMaD can detect the magnets with high efficacy and
provide significant throughput benefits.
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